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The "exoteric" argument starts with propositions plausibly said to meet with no serious demurral: those who are "blessed" must share in things pertaining not only to externals, and to the body, but also to the soul; and as regards the soul, "no one would assert that someone is blessed, who had no particle of courage, or moderation, or justice, or prudence" (1323a24-34). Debate commences over how much of these four cardinal virtues is desirable, and over their value in comparison with other goods. The opponents whom Aristotle places before us do not speak of "blessedness," and think the virtues are of much less importance than acquiring "to the extreme, without limit" such things as "wealth and money and power and fame." In response, "we" will say that "it is easy to gain trustworthy evidence about these matters from the deeds." Aristotle submits two observations about human behavior that apply even to these vulgar opponents and that make plain their thoughtlessness about the importance of intelligence and character, at least as necessary means to external goods, and "regardless of whether living happily for humans consists in pleasure, or virtue, or both" (1323a35-b5). Conspicuously left unchallenged, then, are the potential contestations of thoughtful hedonists who, readily acknowledging the enormous importance of extremely well ordered intelligence and character, would insist, on that very basis, that the goal of the best life is not moral virtue, but the spiritual as well as physical joys discovered in either a private, apolitical life (" lathe biwsas !"), or in the acquisition of vast, though sagaciously measured, wealth, rule, and fame. But Aristotle's rejoinder to challengers is not finished. He continues with three deductive reasonings (1323b6-20). These certainly support the superior value of the soul, and its flourishing, over the value of the body and external goods; again, however, these arguments do not at all establish that spiritual flourishing, and still less happiness (which the reasonings do not mention), consists in or accrues from active moral virtue. Thoughtful hedonistic objectors might well ask on what grounds Aristotle's gentlemen believe it to be more choiceworthy to live abstaining from or sacrificing the flourishing and enjoyment that are found either in secure retirement among friends, or in embracing the risky challenge of maximal rule and its attendant fame and power, including power to enjoy benefiting loved ones.
3 Instead of providing any further argumentation, our philosopher declares the matter settled, "for us," who "agree that happiness falls to ( epiballei ) each in proportion to virtue and prudence, and activity according to them"-"adducing as witness God, who is both happy and also blessed [cf. Ethics 1178b8] through nothing of the external goods," but "by himself, through himself, and by being of a certain quality by nature" (1323b21-26). So, to show what happiness, together with blessedness, truly means "for us," we produce our vision of God, existing in totally self-sufficient independence from all external goods-and, of course, partaking in immortality. Does Aristotle imply that "for us" some kind of sharing in such existence is the dimly hoped for goal or prize that "we" believe, as we look to God, "falls to each," in some degree, proportioned to virtuous activity? Are readers not here afforded a
